Abstract. k -anonymity is the method used for masking sensitive data which successfully solves the problem of re-linking of data with an external source and makes it difficult to re-identify the individual. Thus kanonymity works on a set of quasi-identifiers (public sensitive attributes), whose possible availability and linking is anticipated from external dataset, and demands that the released dataset will contain at least k records for every possible quasi-identifier value. Another aspect of k is its capability of maintaining the truthfulness of the released data (unlike other existing methods). This is achieved by generalization, a primary technique in k -anonymity. Generalization consists of generalizing attribute values and substituting them with semantically consistent but less precise values. When the substituted value doesn't preserve semantic validity the technique is called suppression which is a private case of generalization. We present a hybrid approach called compensation which is based on suppression and swapping for achieving privacy. Since swapping decreases the truthfulness of attribute values there is a tradeoff between level of swapping (information truthfulness) and suppression (information loss) incorporated in our algorithm.
Introduction and Motivation
In today's computerized world, when storage device costs are low, data about individuals are extensively available and easily collected: Internet surfers leave all sorts of tracks at every visited site (from the computer's IP address to submitted forms with private data); email providers scan email traffic; medical patient records are stored in databases; governments maintain records about every citizen; private companies and organizations (such as travel agencies, flight and insurance companies, etc.) collect data about people from a variety of sources. What would happen if some of this information, perhaps financial or healthrelated, became publicly available? It could very possibly lead to community ostracism or even dismissal from work. Clearly, there is a growing concern among individuals that the data they share about themselves, either voluntarily or due to various regulations, should be protected.
Technological advances are increasing the demand for data and there is a growing interest for private companies and universities in using these data for research, to investigate patterns of behaviour and to draw conclusions. In the face of this continually expanding interest in exploiting available datasets, we have seen over the past 10 years increased attention in privacy preserving data mining, a field which tries to provide a tradeoff between maintaining privacy and using the private data.
As an example of this thin line between preserving privacy and using private data, consider a typical hospital's cardiology center where the database undoubtedly includes patient records comprising personal information (such as name, social security number); demographic data (race and age); and medical information (symptoms, diagnosis and medications). An external researcher is interested in using this database in order to generate a complications model for these patients with the aim of introducing a new treatment protocol. A patient record should, of course, be stripped of ifentifiable information before being shared with any person other than the patient's primary physician. Obviously unique identity fields such as name and social security number should be completely removed from the dataset. However, other fields can be used to disclose the real identity of the patient indirectly, especially if part of the data can be linked to other data sources that may include the patients' identities. For example, if there is only a single patient in the database who is 90 years old, then providing the age datum may reveal the identity of this patient.
A real-life example was demonstrated by Sweeney [1] . She purchased a copy of the Cambridge Massachusetts voter registration list and also obtained a copy of medical records of Massachusetts state emploees. Linking together the data from the two datasets, she managed to find medical information about the governor of Massachusetts. Only three attributes were needed: ZIP, Birth date and Sex. She demonstrated that even though sensitive data such as social security numbers were not present in any of the two datasets and examining only one of two datasets alone couldn't provide an inference about a particular individual, nevertheless, cross-linking several datasets provided the governor's personal medical records. In an effort to enhance data privacy, Sweeney proposed a new method, k -anonymity which guarantees privacy protection via linking and allows the safe release of information without invalidating the truthfulness of an individual record.
In this paper we discuss privacy preservation and data mining problems in terms of classification. We propose an algorithm for privacy preserving data mining that performs dataset anonymization using the k -anonymity model while taking into account its effect on classification results. We extend the k -anonymity model by providing new definitions and use several anonymization techniques together in order to get better results in terms of accuracy than reported in the literature.
In Section 2 we discuss related work while Section 3 provides some definitions used in the article and in formulating the problem. In Section 4, we explain how our proposed algorithm works and Section 5 provides experimental results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work
k -anonymity is a popular approach to masking data and avoiding re-identification of sensitive data through common attributes [2] . A dataset complies with kanonymity protection if individual data stored in the released dataset cannot be distinguished from at least k−1 individuals whose data also appears in the dataset. This protection guarantees that the probability of identifying an individual based on the released data in the dataset does not exceed 1/k. Generalization and suppression are the most common methods used for de-identification of the data in kanonymity based algorithms [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . Generalization is a process of substiting an attribute value with a more general value but which is semantically consistent with the previous one using so-called attribute hierarchies. One of the advantages of generalization over other disclosure limitation techniques is that it preserves the truthfulness of the information. However, a major drawback of existing generalization techniques is that domain hierarchy trees are required for every quasiidentifier attribute on which k-anonymity is to be applied [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . These domain hierarchy trees are generated manually by the user before applying the generalization process. In order to overcome the major drawback of generalization we effectively use suppression in our algorithm.
While many other approaches for masking private data exist, we would like to mention swapping since it is used in our algorithm. Proposed in 1978 by Dalenius and Reiss [11] , data swapping selectively modifies a fraction of the records in the database by exchanging a subset of attributes between selected pairs of records. The advantage of swapping lies in the fact that it introduces uncertainty for potential attackers about the true value of a sensitive attribute. Since 1978 many swapping techniques have been proposed [12] , [13] , [14] . A common characteristic to all of the techniques is the attempt to preserve the statistical characteristics of the original dataset (univariate distribution of the swapped attribute, natural dependency between fields, means and variances) rather than high classification results. In contrast to the original definition and purpose of swapping, the technique that we propose here employs swapping as a means for achieving k -anonymity and as a retaining factor for the information loss incurred by suppression. To the best of our knowledge no research has been performed to date where several privacy-preserving techniques are mixed together.
In our previous research [15] , we presented a k-anonymity classification treebased suppression (kACTUS). kACTUS wraps a decision tree inducer which is used to induce a classification tree from the original dataset. kACTUS then uses this tree to apply k-anonymity to the dataset while minimizing the tradeoff between k-anonymity constraints and classification quality. The resultant anonymous dataset can then be sent to an external user that may utilize any induction algorithm for training a classifier over the anonymous dataset. kACTUS uses the suppression approach alone by performing a random selection of instances, which is known to reduce the quality of the data when inefficiently applied. Moreover this randomness injection may cause the performance of the algorithm to be unstable. Results might be improved if a greedy selection rule is used.
In this paper we present a variation of kACTUS that we refer to as kACTUS-2. Our new revised algorithm does not randomly select records, instead it uses an information gain criterion for selecting the best instances to suppress. Moreover, kACTUS-2 efficiently uses multi-dimensional suppression and swapping so that the performance of the new method outperforms previous algorithm and other generalization methods which require manually defined generalization taxonomies.
Problem Formulation
In this section several definitions which will be used later in the article are introduced and the problem formulation is presented (Definition 9). The following two definitions are adopted from [3] . kACTUS-2 receives a decision tree as input and works with its decision nodes. The algorithm does not use information about the value of the target node directly from the decision tree, thus when a term leaf node will be further encountered it will denote only that the node is a decision node which have zero child nodes.
Definition 1 (Quasi-identifier). Given a population U , a person-specific table
P T (A 1 , . . . , A n ), f c : U → P T and f g : P T → U , where U ⊆ U . A quasi- identifier of PT, written Q T is a set of attributes A i , . . . , A j ⊆ A 1 , . . . , An where ∃p i ∈ U such that f g (f c (p i )[Q P T ]) = p i .
Definition 2 (k-anonymity
Definition 4 (Complying Node and Non-complying Node). Let us suppose that we follow a tree branch from the root node a 1 to a leaf node a n . We construct an attribute-value set going down the branch up to the leaf node a n . If the number of tuples in a dataset, consisting of the attribute-value set is greater or equal to the k-anonymity threshold than we call a leaf a n a complying node, otherwise we call it a non-complying node. From the properties of decision trees we can state that there are only complying and non-complying nodes in the tree. [3] , suppression means that a specific value from the original dataset will be substituted by a meaningless one in the anonymized dataset. In this paper, we assume that suppression is used on the non-complying node only where we prune the leaf node of the noncomplying node, thus suppressing all the attribute values which are associated with that node.
Definition 5 (Suppression). As defined by Sweeney in
We used the question mark "?" as a symbol for the suppressed value which is interpreted by the evaluated inducers as a missing value. 
Definition 6 (Compensation). Using Definition 4 about complying and noncomplying nodes, we propose a general approach for achieving k-anonymity using decision trees called compensation. A complying node can manipulate its associated records such that it can compensate part of its records in favor of a noncomplying node in order to turn a non-complying node into a complying one. kACTUS-2 performs compensation by suppression and compensation by swapping. In addition compensation works only between sibling leaf nodes which have a common parent.

Definition 7 (Compensation by Suppression). We now extend the definition of suppression given in Definition 5. Compensation by suppression is always accompanied by suppression of non-complying nodes. First, we check how many records are required for the non-complying node to be compliant. Let us assume that the number of required records is k − m where m is the number of records associated with the non-complying node. Suppose that there is a compliant node which can compensate k − m of its records. We select k − m records from a complying node (selection criteria are described in Section 4) and suppress their attribute values associated with the complying leaf node. The suppression of the non-complying node and compensation by suppression guarantee that a non-complying node will be compliant.
Definition 8 (Compensation by Swapping
. , a n and target class y from a distribution D over the labeled instance space, the goal is to find an optimal transformation such that S' satisfies k-anonymity. Optimality is defined in terms of minimizing the deterioration in the generalized accuracy over the distribution D as a result of replacing classifier I(S) with classifier I(S').
Method
Recall from the problem definition 9 that our objective is to get an anonymous dataset where predictive performance of a classifier trained on the anonymous dataset will be comparable to the performance of the classifier trained on the original dataset. In our approach we wrap an existing classification tree induction algorithm (such as C4.5) trained on the quasi-identifiers of the original dataset. Having the classification model of the original dataset, we can perform k-anonymization by manipulating leaves of the decision tree. If all the leaves in the tree are complying nodes then we can say that the dataset complies with k-anonymity. For leaves that do not comply with k-anonymity we perform one of two operations: Suppression and Compensation by Suppression (Def. 5 and 7) or Compensation by Swapping (Def. 8).
How a Complying Node Is Selected for Compensation by Swapping
Every complying node is checked against a non-complying node. First, we perform a virtual compensation by swapping on a complying node and check what is the final entropy [16] of its remaining records. Shannon entropy of a random variable X having the probability distribution p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is given by:
Lastly, the complying node minimal final entropy is selected for compensation.
How Compensation by Swapping is Performed
Once a complying node is selected for compensation, we perform an actual swapping in the following way. We check which class value has less influence in terms of entropy on the records associated with a non-complying node. Given a class value we search in the original dataset for a record associated with the complying node having that class value. Provided such a record is found, we select it and swap its attribute value associated with a leaf node by the attribute value of the non-complying leaf node. If such a record was not found, we check which class value will have less influence on the final entropy after we remove such a record from the set of records associated with a complying node. The same swapping process as described above is applied on the selected record. Given initial number m < k of records associated with the non-complying node, where k is the anonymity threshold, we perform k − m iterations and in every iteration we perform swapping as described above.
The kACTUS-2 Algorithm
Algorithms 1-4 describes our new method for k-anonymity. Since the algorithm uses several helper functions which are quite straightforward, we don't provide their pseudo-code. However the general descriptions and explanations are presented below.
root -returns the root node of CT height -returns the height (length of the longest path from the node to the leaf) parent -returns parent of the node count-instances -counts instances in the dataset associated with a particular node move-complying-node -moves instances associated with the complying node to the anonymized dataset with non-quasi-identifiers of the original instance if any. remove-leaf-nodes -remove leaf nodes of a node get-total-instance-count -counts the total number of instances associated with all the nodes in the set move-root-non-complying-nodes -moves the instances associated with root nodes by first suppressing all quasi-identifiers (the root node contains only one quasi-identifier) and keeps only the target class value of the original instance along with non-quasi-identifiers of the instance, if any. get-non-complying-leafs -given a node, returns all leafs which don't comply with k -anonymity. get-complying-leafs -given a node, returns all leafs which comply with kanonymity. move-instances -like move-complying-node but takes set of nodes as an input. calculate-final-compliant-entropy -The explanation is given further in this section.
swap-from-complying -performs swapping of the attribute value of the complying leaf node to the attribute value of the non-complying leaf node and swapping of the class value required by the non-complying node to keep its entropy at a low level. See Definition 8 and Subsection 4.2 for detailed explanations. move-non-complying-instances -like move-instances but before moving such instances, the attribute of the leaf node is removed from all the instances (suppressed). compensate-from-complying -See Definition 7 for a detailed explanation.
The algorithm requires the following input parameters:
1. k -anonymity threshold KT 2. swapping threshold ST 3. original dataset OD 4. classification tree CT 5. set of non-quasi-identifiers
The output of the algorithm is the anonymized dataset AD.
The process is as follows: we iterate over the classification tree while it has at least one root node. Having selected a root-node we find the longest path from it to the leaf node. If the longest path is of a height greater than 1 it means that the root-node has children and thus we can call the main function called PerformAnonymization (line 1.15), otherwise we need to check how many instances are associated with the particular root-node. If the number of instances is greater or equal to the k -anonymity threshold then we move the instances from the original dataset (CS) to the anonymized dataset (line 1.18). After that we remove the root-node from the classification tree (line 1.19) . If the number of instances is less than the k -anonymity threshold we add the node to a set of non-complying nodes (line 1.21). When all root nodes are pruned from the classification tree we need to check how many instances in total are associated with all the non-complying nodes stored in the non-complying set (line 1.25). If the total number of instances is greater or equal to the k -anonymity threshold we call the move-root-non-complying-nodes function (line 1.25) which moves these instances to the anonymized dataset. Only the target attribute and non-quasiidentifiers of the original instance are retained. On the other hand, if the total number of instances are less than the k -anonymity threshold we do not copy these instances to the anonymized dataset. In such cases the anonymized dataset can contain less instances than the original one, however data loss is bounded by the k-threshold, so in a worst case scenario the maximum number of records which can be lost is k − 1.
Algorithm 2 describes the PerformAnonymization procedure. This procedure gets the leaf node with the longest path to the root found in Algorithm 1 as a parameter. Using the parent function we acquire the parent of this node (line 2.2). Then, we check how many instances are associated with the parent. This means that we need to count all the instances of its child nodes. If the total number of instances is less than the k -threshold then we just prune the parent node by removing all its children (line 2.4). In lines 2.7 and 2.8 we get two sets which contain complying and non-complying leaf nodes (children of the parent node). An additional check is performed on line 2.9 such that if the set which holds non-complying leafs is empty, there is no need to continue further. We just move all instances associated with the complying leaf node (line 2.10) and prune all the children (line 2.11). We call two functions PerformSwapping and PerformSuppression in succession on lines 2.14 and 2.15. Finally we prune all the children nodes (line 2.16).
Algorithm 3 describes the PerformSwapping procedure. It starts by iterating over non-complying nodes (lines 3.2-3.22). First, we calculate how many instances are required in order to make the non-complying nodes compliant (lines 3.3). Then, the required-ratio is calculated and compared to the swapping threshold, ST (line 3.4). We perform swapping only if the ratio of required instances is less than the predefined ST . For every non-complying node, the inner loop is started over complying nodes (lines 3.9-3.16) in order to find the best complying node to perform swapping (lines 3.11-3.15) Finally, when the best-complying-node is found, we move the instances associated with the non-complying node to the anonymized dataset using the move-instances function (line 3.20) and perform swapping using the swap-from-complying function (line 3.21).
Algorithm 4 describes the PerformSuppression procedure. In lines 4.2-4.13 we iterate over complying nodes. We need to check whether the complying node is capable of compensating some of its instances to non-complying nodes. In order to implement this action, we start the inner loop over non-complying nodes (lines 4.3-4.11). We obtain the number of instances which can be given by the complying node (line 4.4 and the number of instances required by the noncomplying node (line 4.5). If the number of instances which the complying node can compensate is greater or equal to the number of required instances then compensation is possible, otherwise compensation is not used. Finally, we move instances associated with the non-complying node to the anonymized dataset (line 4.9) but with the leaf attribute value suppressed. After this step is carried out, the compensate-from-complying function is called to compensate the required number of instances of the complying node (line 4.10). The remaining instances of the complying node will be moved to the anonymized dataset (line 4.12).
Experimental Evaluation
This section presents the results of various issues that were examined in regard to the proposed algorithm: (1) verification of the proposed hybrid approach for achieving k-anonymity without reasonable loss of classification accuracy; (2) comparison of kACTUS-2 with TDS, TDR and kADET algorithms presented in [6] , [9] and [10] in terms of classification accuracy, information loss and statistical significance; (3) comparison of kACTUS-2 with former algorithm kACTUS in terms of classification accuracy, information loss, statistical significance and data loss.
Algorithm 1. kACTUS-2 (Part 1)
Input: 1:
KT -k-anonymity threshold 2:
ST -swapping threshold 3:
OD -original dataset 4:
CT -classification tree 5:
NQI -non-quasi-identifier set 
Datasets
A comparative experimental-study was carried out using five datasets from the UCI Repository [17] : Adult, German Credit, TTT, Glass Identification and Waveform. Researchers into k-anonymity mostly work with Adult and German Credit datasets as they are the most suitable, publicly available benchmarks. We use three additional publicly available datasets (TTT, Glass Identification and Waveform) to evaluate the performance of the above mentioned algorithms.
The Adult dataset has six continuous and eight categorical attributes and a binary class attribute which represents income levels (less or more than 50K). The numerical data was discretized by a supervised discretization filter using a Weka datamining framework [18] as a preprocessing step. The dataset has 45222 records. A domain generalization hierarchy was built using all 14 attributes and Algorithm 2. kACTUS-2 (Part 2) 
15: PerformSuppression(complying-leafs, non-complying-leafs, KT, ST, CS, AD, NQI)
16:
remove-leaf-nodes(parent-node) 17: end procedure was adopted from [6] . The domain generalization hierarchy was used by TDS, TDR and kADET algorithms.
The German Credit dataset contains observations on 30 variables for 1000 past applicants for credit. Each applicant was rated as a good credit (700 cases) or bad (300 cases). We used nine quasi-identifiers as was proposed by [9] : credit history, savings account, duration in month, status of existing checking account, credit amount, purpose, property, installment rate in percentage of disposal income, other debtors.
The TTT dataset encodes the complete set of possible board configurations at the end of tic-tac-toe games. It contains 958 instances and nine categorical attributes and positive and negative binary class values. All attributes were used as quasi-identifiers.
The Glass Identification database contains 214 instances and nine continuous attributes. We performed supervised discretization of continuous attributes. The class label represents seven types of glass: building windows float processed, building windows non float processed, vehicle windows float processed, vehicle windows non float processed, containers, tableware, headlamps. All attributes were used as quasi-identifiers.
The Waveform Database Generator contains 5000 instances and 40 continuous attributes which were discretized by Weka. Class label represents three classes of waves. All attributes were used as quasi-identifiers.
Comparing to Other k-Anonymity Algorithms
In order to evaluate classification accuracy of the proposed method and compare it with other algorithms, we divided each dataset into a so-called 5x2 cross for all nc in non-complying-leafs do 3:
required ← KT -count-instances(nc) 4:
required-ratio ← required / KT 5:
if ST < required-ratio then 6: continue swapping is not possible 7:
end if 8:
best-complying-node ← 9:
for all c in complying-leafs do 10:
if [19] . The method is based on five iterations of a twofold cross validation. All five algorithms were evaluated on training sets with different k-anonymity thresholds. We evaluated four classification algorithms in the induction phase in order to examine various induction biases: C4.5 [20] , PART [18] , Naïve Bayes and Logistic [21] . All experiments were performed using Weka. The performance graphs we generated represent the classification accuracy as a function of k.
The evaluation results are very encouraging. Figures 1-5 present performance graphs using a C4.5 classifier. Figure 1 displays a classification accuracy graph for the Adult dataset with the anonymity threshold of 5 ≤ k ≤ 1000. The classification accuracy of the original model is 85.96. The k values we used are: 5, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1000. We can see that the classification accuracy of kACTUS and kACTUS-2 with k = 5 is considerably higher than that of TDS, TDR and kADET. But the accuracy of kACTUS-2 converges to the accuracy of TDS for k = 1000, while the classification accuracy of kACTUS becomes worse than kADET starting from about k = 700 and starting from k = 900 with TDS. gets worse and in the range 45 ≤ k ≤ 78 the classification accuracy of kACTUS is higher. Classification accuracy of kACTUS-2 converges to the accuracy of kADET for k = 100 and both algorithms provide best results at k = 100. Figure 3 shows the classification accuracy of the TTT dataset using the C4. We can see that kACTUS-2 performance deteriorates very slowly and its graph is almost horizontal. kACTUS performance is slightly worse than kACTUS-2 but better than kADET, TDS and TDR. Since we used all 40 attributes of the Waveform dataset as quasi-identifiers, the performance graph can suggest that kACTUS-2, kACTUS and kADET can work with a large number of quasi-identifiers while TDS and TDR cannot handle a large number of quasi-identifiers without losing classification accuracy. This is clearly seen in the example of the German dataset in Figure 2 . Because the curves of the compared algorithms might intersect, we used the Area Under Curve (AUC) measurement as a single value metric to compare algorithms and establish a dominance relationship among them. A better algorithm should have a larger area. The reported values in Table 1 represent the mean AUC performance in the Adult, German, TTT, Glass and Waveform datasets respectively. The results indicate that kACTUS-2 outperforms the other four algorithms in 11 cases out of a total of 20. kACTUS-2 outperforms TDS in 15 cases out of 20 and TDR in 18 cases out of 20. Moreover kACTUS-2 outperforms kADET using C4.5 in all datasets. Note that since the output of kADET is an anonymous C4.5 decision tree rather than an anonymous dataset, we cannot compare it to other classification algorithms. More important, kACTUS-2 outperforms kACTUS in 13 out of 20 cases. In contrast to the kACTUS algorithm, kACTUS-2 does not use a random generator thus it provides more stable results, and it achieves an average reduction of 0.5% in classification error with respect to kACTUS.
In order to check whether all five algorithms construct classifiers over a test set with the same error rate, we followed the procedure proposed in [22] . First an adjusted Friedman test was used in order to reject the null hypothesis and then a Bonferroni-Dunn test was applied to examine whether kACTUS-2 performs significantly better than the other four algorithms. We found that kACTUS-2 statistically outperforms TDS, TDR, kADET, kACTUS with a confidence level of 95%.
Information Loss
A metric which is of great importance for us is information loss. Information loss in our case is the number of missing values contained in a dataset divided by the total number of values. Suppression is not as flexible as generalization, so one would anticipate a higher information loss rate in kACTUS-2 than in TDS and TDR. However, this is not the case as can be seen in Table 2 , which displays suppression rates in percentages for five datasets. Since the output of kADET is an anonymized model rather than a dataset we cannot obviously determine its rate of information loss.
The results are very encouraging. From Table 2 we can see that the kACTUS-2 information loss rate is lower in 19 cases out of a total of 32 cases. The kACTUS-2 rate is lower for all values of k in the TTT, Glass and Waveform datasets. The kACTUS-2 rate is lower in two cases out of six cases in the Adult dataset and higher in the German dataset for every value of k.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a new method of using k-anonymity for preserving privacy in classification tasks. The proposed method requires no prior knowledge and can be used by any inducer. It combines compensation by suppression presented in [15] and compensation by swapping which decreases information loss induced by the suppression approach. The new method also shows a higher predictive performance and less information loss when compared to existing stateof-the-art methods.
Issues to be studied further include: examining kACTUS-2 in relation to other decision trees inducers. kACTUS-2 should also be extended to other data mining tasks (such as clustering and association rules) and anonymity measures (such as l-diversity) which respond to different known attacks against k-anonymity, such as homogeneous and background attacks.
